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CASE COMMENTS

remedy for challenging the illegality of imprisonment. A proceeding
under the act is commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the
court in which conviction took place. The petition should contain all
facts, records or other evidence supporting its allegations. It should
clearly state the relief desired and any previous proceedings that the
petitioner has taken to secure relief from his conviction. Perhaps the
most distinctive feature of the act is the wide discretion which the
court many exercise in each case. 24 Not only would adoption of such a
procedure avoid much confusion and unnecessary expense, but by
examining each case in light of its peculiar circumstances, the rights
of the individual will be preserved.
ANDREW W.

McTHENIA, JR.

APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
TO COMMERCIAL LEASES
The Rule against Perpetuities is today virtually the same rule that
gradually crystallized between 1682 and 1833.1 Recently, however,
there has been a tendency to mitigate the full rigor of the rule in
commercial transactions, a tendency that may have important implications in the law of future interests.
An example is .to be found in the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Isen v. Giant Food, Inc.,2 in which the
plaintiff sought specific performance or damages for an alleged breach
of a contract to make a lease. The contract stipulated .that Isen would
purchase certain land 3 when it had been zoned for commercial purthat the Act had disrupted the efficient procedure of criminal appeals in that convicted persons abused the orderly process of the judicial system. The Maryland act,
fd. Ann. Code art. 27 §§ 645A-645J (supp. 1961), is commented on in ig Md. L. Rev.
233 (1959). The Oregon statute is found in Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 138..5oo-138.68o (1959).
Illinois and North Carolina have enacted statutes providing for post-conviction
proceedings, but they are so at variance with the Uniform Act that they cannot
be considered substantial adoptions thereof. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 §§ 826-832 (SmithHurd 1g6i) and N.C. Gen Stat. §§ 15-217-15-222 (1959).
For a discussion of these and other remedies provided in the different states
see Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (1961).
-""If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate
order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings, and
any supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper." Uniform
Post Conviction Procedure Act § 7.
1
Morris 9: Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities 11 (1956).
'2-95 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
3
lsen owned contracts to purchase this land from others at the time of execution of the contract to lease.
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poses and that within twenty days after this acquisition the parties
would execute a lease for a supermarket to be constructed by Isen on
the premises. Isen acquired the land, which had been zoned for commercial purposes, but Giant Food refused to enter into the lease arrangement. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
Giant Food on the ground that the contract violated the rule against
perpetuities.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
decision of the lower court. The court recognized that the rule against
perpetuities applies to the interests in land created by contracts to
lease but found that the time limitation of the rule4 was not violated
in this case. The appellate court reached this conclusion by reading
into the contract an implied term that the zoning change was to be
obtained within a reasonable time. As so interpreted, the contract
would lapse long before the rule against perpetuities could be violated
by a failure to obtain a zoning change.
Since the real estate involved was in Virginia, the court undertook
to apply the Virginia rule against perpetuities. 5 For the Virginia rule,
the court relied on Burruss v. Baldwin,6 in which the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said: "Any executory interest which by possibility, may not take effect until after lives in being and twenty-one
years and ten months, is ipso facto and ad initio void." 7 This quotation indicates that Virginia strictly applies the common law rule
against perpetuities.8
The problem faced by the court in the principal case was twofold:
firstly, whether the interest created by the contract to make a lease is
susceptible of application of the rule against perpetuities; and secondly, whether, if the rule is applicable, the interest sought to be
created was invalidated by the rule.
In its decision that the interest created by the contract to make a
lease was subject to the rule against perpetuities, the court was in
accord with the weight of authority. A contract that raises an equi'One expression of the rule is as follows: "When no life in being forms any
part of the period of suspension or postponement of the time when the estate or
interest is to become vested, the limit of time under the rule against perpetuities is twenty-one years." Murphy v. Johnston, igo Ga. 23, 8 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1940).
F.2d at 137.
5295
0
jg9 Va. 883, 1o S.E.-d 249 (1958).
3
7Id. at 887, 1o3 S.E.2d at 252.
8
See Claiborne v. Wilson, 168 Va. 469, 474, 192 S.E. 585, 586 ('937); Skeen v.
Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89, 90 (1923); Griffith v. Thompson,
28 Va. (1 Leigh) 321, 329 (1829); 1 Minor, Real Property § 811 (2d ed. 1928). But
see Note, The Rule Against Perpetuities in Virginia, 41 Va. L. Rev. 842, 860 (1955).
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table right in property, which the obligee can enforce by specific performance 9 is generally held to be subject to the rule against perpetuities.10 But, the court's decision that the interest was not invalidated
by the rule against perpetuities due to the application of the reasonable time concept implicit in all contracts appears to be a departure from the orthodox approach to this question. The orthodox
approach would be to apply the property rule exclusively, i.e., the
strict rule against perpetuities without any consideration of the contract rules which might serve as limitations upon the applicable
property rules."
An example of the orthodox view may be found in the decision of
the California District Court of Appeals in Haggarty v. City of Oakland,12 in which a leasehold interest which, by terms of the lease, was
not to vest until the completion of a building at an uncertain future
time was held invalid as being in violation of the rule against perpetuities. The majority of the California court rejected the "reasonable
time" approach as "unsound" and "deceptively simple."' 3 The court
stated that it creates an exception to the application of the rule against
perpetuities, and exceptions, no matter how innocuous, ought not to
be allowed. Contract law was rejected as a factor in determining the
4
validity of the property interest created by the lease agreement.
The principal case, involving a lease to commence in the future, 5
PContracts to make a lease my be specifically enforced, Norman Co. v. Du Pont
Co., 12 Del. Ch. 155, io8 At. 743 (1920); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Rose, 152 Md. 146,
136 Atl. 651 (1927); New York Produce Exch. Safe Deposit Co. v. New York Produce
Exch. Co., 2o8 App. Div. 421, 203 N.Y. Supp. 648 (ist Dep't 1924); 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1143 at 641 (1951). See also 4 Williston, Contracts § 945 at 2643 (rev. ed.

1936).
"First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Purcell, 244 S.W.-d 458, 461 (Ky. '95i);
Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.-d 619, 626 (Mo. 1955); First Huntington Nat'l Bank
v. Gideon Broh! Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953); West Virginial'ittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.-d 46 (1947).
"Rules as to remoteness of vesting apply to land interests created by contract the same as those created by limitation. London & So. W. Ry. N. Gomm, 20
Ch. D. 562 (C.A. 1889). See First Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon Broh Realty
Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675, 687 (1953). But see Hill v. State Box Co., 114
Cal. App. 2d 44, 249 P.2d 9o3 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
'161 Cal. App. ad 407, 326 P.-d 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
'3326 P.2d at 966.
"Ibid.
rThere have been cases, however, which have used this reasonable time approach concerning other types of interests. See, e.g., Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn.
299, 27 At. 585 (1893); Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1884); Brandenburg v.
Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 103, 28 N.E. 575, 576 (1885).
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adopts the modern approach which has been advocated by several
writers'( and the dissenting opinion in the Haggarty case. 17
It has been generally held that the rule against perpetuities is a
rule of law and not a rule of construction.'8 The Restatement of
Property, however, says that when a conveyance is susceptible of two
possible constructions, only one of which violates the rule against
perpetuities, the court may choose the construction that does not violate it. 19 Gray similarly recognizes that a real ambiguity in the words
of the parties may lead to construing the contract so as not to violate
the rule.2 0 The Restatement rule in this'context lends support to the
modern view, mitigating the harsh result reached by strict application
of the orthodox view of the rule against perpetuities.
The "wait and see" doctrine2 ' which has been urged by Professor

Leach, 22 discredited by others,2 3 and occasionally adopted by state legislatures, 24 would also support the result in the Isen case. Under the
"wait and' see" doctrine the court waits to see if the contingency will
happen so that the interest will vest if the contingency occurs within
the time limit prescribed by the rule against perpetuities. The interest
will be upheld if it vests during the prescribed time and struck down
if it does not. Under the common law rule against perpetuities the
future interest is either validated or invalidated as of the time of its
creation, and vesting in fact within the limits of the rule is immaterial.2 5 The chief objection to the "wait and see" doctrine is that land
may be tied up for any period within that allowed by the rule against
"6Berg, Long-Term Options and Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 235,
419 (1949); 47 Calif. L. Rev. 197 (1959).
17326 P.2d at 966.
IsEquitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 17 Del. Ch. 203, 161 Atl. 712, 714 (1930);
Burruss v. Baldwin, 199 Va. 883, 1o3 S.E.2d 249 (1958); Shenandoah Valley Nat'l
Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63 S.E.2d 786 (1951); Rose v. Rose, 191 Va. 171, 60
S.E.2d 45 (1950); Brookover v. Grimm, 118 W.Va. 227, 19o S.E. 697 (1937).
I"Restatement, Property § 243, comment n (194o).
"Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 633 (4 th ed. 1942).
21
So named by Professor W. Barton Leach. Simes & Smith, Future Interests §
123o, at 127 (2d ed. 1956).
"2Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 70 L.Q. Rev. 478 (1954); Leach,
Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721
(1952); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style; 67 Harv. L. Rev. 13,19
(1954).
23Schuyler, Should the Rule against Perpetuities Discard its Vest?, 56 Mich.
L. Rev. 683 (1958); Simes, Is the Rule against Perpetuities Doomed? The Wait and
See Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953); Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1230
(2d ed. 1956).
8
"See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-95 (195 ); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 184A
tit.
27,
§§ 502-503 (1959).
Stat.
Ann.
(1954); Me. Laws Ch. 244 (1955); Vt.
"Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 214 n.i (4th ed. 1942).
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perpetuities, since there is always the possibility of a vesting as a valid
interest at the last minute.1 ; The doctrine seems to encourage arrange27
ments restricting alienability.
The important distinguishing feature between the "reasonable
time" and the "wait and see" doctrines is that under the former the
interest either vests or lapses within a reasonable time after the contract is made, which will ordinarily be long before the rule runs. It
would seem that this distinction would make the reasonable time doctrine the better one of the two considering the public policy against
remote vesting of future interests.
The reasonable time doctrine as applied by the court in the Isen
case has the effect of exempting from the rule against perpetuities a
large majority of contracts concerning the sale or lease of a future
interest in land where the performance date is uncertain. This doctrine seems to answer the objections to the orthodox approach of applying the rule against perpetuities "remorselessly" 28 to any property
interest susceptible to its application. Contracts in which the parties
clearly intended the interest created to vest, if at all, within a reasonable time will be upheld; and unscrupulous parties who would invoke the rule's application merely to avoid an obligation imposed
upon them by their contract will fail.209 It is arguable, though, that

the reasonable time doctrine offends the basic purpose of the rule, i.e.,
the prevention of remote vesting of future estates in land. 30 Courts
would be relieved of the burden placed upon them by this litigation
if parties would draft such contracts so as clearly to comply with the
rule against perpetuities. The rule of the Isen case does not encourage
this.
The rule against perpetuities is admittedly an "ancient common
law rule of property" 3 1 but its basic purpose to prevent remoteness of
32
vesting of future interests in land remains valid in modern society

Any exception naturally tends to weaken the rule.33 A decision which
Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1230 (2d ed. 1956).
2Ibid.
2Shenandaoh Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 142, 63 S.E.2d 786, 790
(1951); Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 629 (4th ed. 1942).
"But see Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 330.3 (4 th ed. 1942).
-'ld. at § 2.
3lSchuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard its Vest?, 56 Mich. L.
Rev. 683, 688 (1958).
See Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 268 (4 th ed. 1942); Morris & Leach
The Rule Against Perpetuities 17 (1956).
-1Haggarty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P. 2d 957 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958).

